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1 Revised version of a lecture at the second International Varna Seminar
On the Way to Convertibility in Central and East European Countries, October
1990. Prof. dr. Todor Valtchev, Dr. Lyubomir Mitov and Prof. Nesho Tzarevski
provided useful insights about the bulgarían economy. John Williamson and
other Seminar participants gave stimulating comments. The views in this paper
are solely my own.Introduction
Economic growth in Bulgaria has been stagnant since 1989, inflation is going
up and the Lev is rapidly losing its value in terms of other currencíes. In
March 1990, the Bulgarian authorities declared a moratorium on the country's
external debt. Under these dífficult economíc circumstances, an intense debate
has been engaged about the appropriate future monetary policy of the nation,
and many new options are open now that Bulgaria has been accepted in the 1990
annual Meetíngs as a member of the IMF and the World Bank.
It would be inappropriate for a first time visítor to Bulgaria to offer firm
advice on policy for a country on which little research has been published and
for which the past in any event no longer provides much guidance about the
future. Currency convertibility and monetary policy have to be dicussed under
conditions of great economic and polítical flux, not only in Bulgaria itself,
but also in all of its ex-Comecon trading partners. Nevertheless it may be of
some use to recall a number of argwnents that are important for decídíng upon
the te of the transition to convertibilíty as well as the form in which
convertibility might take place.
Timing of convertíbility
Withín one year of the polítical changes of November 1989, a consensus has
formed in Bulgaria that the Lev must become a convertible currency. Officially
this has been underlined by the acceptance of Bulgaria as a member of the IMF
which stipulates in article VIII of its Articles of Agreement: "no member
shall without the permission of the Fund impose restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current ínternational transactions". However,
according to Article XIV member countries may preserve temporarily the
existing límitations and controls on current payments. As members of the Fund,
however, countries must strive to make the transition to convertibility when
economic conditíons make this possible.
Bulgarian economists differ about the timing of a move to convertíbility.
Mitov wrítes: "Different views have been voiced. Some understand
convertibility solely as the ptoduct of a balanced and strong economy,
postponing the problem to the indefinite future, Others plead for íts
immediate introduction, despite existíng shortages and imbalances in the
economy - seeing convertíbility as a means to economic recovery, despitez
inheient risks".
A realístic debate about the timing of a move to convertibility on cuzrent
account must take ínto consideratíon that foreign currency already plays an
important role in all central and Eastern European economies. U.S. dollars and
DMarks are widely accepted in urban areas, and may even be the preferred
medium of exchange for many residents. This seems to be the essential
difference between the situation in Eastern Europe today and, for example, in
Western Europe after World War II. The other crucial difference with other
times when countríes contemplated making their currencies convertible is that
in Eastern Europe the transition from a collectivíst to a market economy has
been agreed in principle but still needs to be implemented. It seems to me
that these two factors together make earlier víews about the tíming of the
change to convertibility no longer directly applicable to Eastern Europe
today.
Here are some well-known traditional arguments for cautíon:
Political uncertainty and the general wish to diversify one's portfolio
may índuce residents to move part of their savings to foreign
countries. With currency convertibility the implicit costs of doíng so
are much reduced, even if the currency is only convertible for
transactions on current account. Over-invoicing of imports, under-
invoicing of exports and a variety of other legal or íllegal means are
available once the currency becomes convertible for trade and tourism.
It may be in the natíonal interest, however, to stímulate domestic
savíngs and to discourage for at least some tíme internatíonal
diversification of domestic wealth. A non-convertible currency may make
it much more costly to transfer part of domestic wealth abroad.
Tourists going abroad may use valuable foreign currency and - once
again - invest their wealth or even their talents in foreign
countríes. A non-convertible currency allows for political control over
outward-bound tourísm.
All such arguments against early convertibílity involve substantial political
control over economíc transactions and ímportant limítations on the freedom
of contract between domestic residents and foreigners. Here follow some points
associated with postponíng the move to convertibilíty:3
If government has the power to allocate foreign exchange, this will
easily become a source of corrupted practices and will involve a
bureaucracy that is costly not only in the direct budgetary sense but
also because vital ímports may be delayed through excessive red tape.
Domestic entrepreneurs may judge that black market activities and
smuggling may offer attractive rewards, but there is a difference
between the prívate and social benefits of such actívities.
Distorted domestic relative prices that are out of line wíth world
prices complícate business life for domestic firms and have social
costs. A convertible currency makes distorted domestic prices far more
visible and may even prevent continued distortíons because of
substitution effects both in production and consumption. For instance,
in Western Europe the past few years have shown how much discipline ís
imposed on domestic governments in the area of taxation because of
further integration of the financial, labour, and goods markets in the
European Community. We observe a clear convergence of Value Added Tax
rates as well as of income tax schedules not because the different
politicians have come to agree about the optimal structure of taxation,
but because their resídents will move eíther their purchases or their
work effort abroad if índuced to do so by glaring differences in rates
of taxation.
Possibly of all these arguments the final argument against postponing the
transition to convertibility should dominate. For, the transition to a market
economy wíll suffer if domestic relative prices differ substantíally from
world prices, or if there is persistent political uncertainty about the
continuation or termination of such distortions. To impose domestic relative
prices that are more in agreement with world market conditions will initially
impose heavy adjustment costs on consumers and producers. Familíes have become
used to subsidizatíon of food and some basic commodíties. The benefits of more
realistic prices do not appear immediately; the costs of reduced subsidies
hurt directly. For that reason alone, removal of distortions in relative
príces will stimulate strong political opposition on the consumer side.
Producers will have to make equally hard adjustments if important relatíve
prices and subsidies change. A very important advantage of currency
convertibility ís that the speed wíth which domestic relative prices adjust4
to co~iditions in the world market no longer depends on domestic polítical
conditíons but is imposed from abroad.
External discíplining has worked well in putting some constraints on taxation
policies in the European Community; ít may also be the most feasible way to
achíeve a more sensible structure of relative prices in the economies of
Eastern Europe. With a convertible currency the whole world market is on your
side íf you wish to remove distortions in relative prices. Because future
prosperity requires a market economy, and a market economy in turn presupposes
realistic relative prices and far fewer distortions, immediate currency
convertibility may help to import a relative price structure that could be
politically impossible to obtain through individual domestic political
decísíons.
I should also like to suggest that the bias in favour of large firms and
against small firms and new entrepreneurs may be an additíonal very important
argument to remove concrol over foreign exchange from the central authorities.
In my own country, the Netherlands, políticians belonging to the two largest
political parties are now actively debating the amount of government support
that would be needed to help Philips, the struggling electronics firm. And
this within a context of strong economic growth, a very tight labour market
and an unsustaineably large budget deficit. Government subsidization of
Philips implíes higher taxes to the detriment of other fírms and potentíal new
entrepreneurs. However, in the "market" for politícal influence large existing
companies have a more concentrated power in favour of subsidies than those who
eventually pay the budgetary costs. In addition, prof. Hayek's warníngs that
governments have no comparative advantage in guessing whích future activities
are most promising (and would best be served with foreign exchange) apply with
full force. Finally, political control over foreign exchange imposes
unavoidable heavy distortions in the domestíc credit market. Some companies
may find it easy to generate cash flow or to attract capital in order to
expand, but may fail to obtain foreign exchange for vital imports of
machínery, Other businesses may have little cash flow and few attractions for
potential creditors, but they enjoy the politícal connections that are helpful
in obtaining foreign exchange. A"shadow" market in foreign exchange will
appear in which fírms and individuals will try to obtain lícenses to import.
However, there will be a varying degree of political control over thís
"market", leading to an uncertain and inefficient set of constraints on firms'
activities.5
T'he Sovíet Union and some of the other ex-socialist economíes have promoted
cooperatíve forms of organization for smaller enterprises. Some cooperatíves
are spin-offs of Larger state-owned firms; others have arísen to perform tasks
that were neglected in the past. As long as domestic relative prices remain
grossly distorted, managers of state firms may take a personal pecuniary
interest in a new cooperative and deal with these smaller privately-owned
satellites in ways that are socíally harmful even though individually
profitable. For instance, a state firm may sell subsidízed inputs to a
cooperatíve which then subsequently sells its output at a realístic price.
News reports from eastern Europe suggest that such practices are strongly
dislíked by the public, which suspects big-firm managers to have a selfish
interest ín some cooperatives. By contrast, other coopera[ives may be
eliminated by state fírms that have exclusíve rights to foreign exchange or
cheap government-provided inputs and compete with the cooperatíve in consumer
markets. I[ would be regrettable if the transitional phase to a market economy
was greatly hampered by these two different types of problems and this may be
one additional reason to favour policies such as ímmedíate convertibility of
the currency that lead to a realistic relative price structure.
The transition to a market economy wi11 wítness the establishment of many
sma11 firms which have to survive a symbiosis with a number of extremely large
enterprises, either state-owned or not yet prívatised. It is essential that
the new firms and cooperatives can compete on equal terms with the state-owned
conglomerates. Thís requires that the so-called soft budget contraint for the
state-owned enterpríses is replaced by a binding budget constraint. In other
words, losses must have consequences also for socialízed firms. Additionally,
the rule of law obviously must apply not only to the new privatized firms and
cooperatives, but also to the state-owned businesses: bureaucratic favouritism
has no place in a true market economy. It would be naive to forget that
politicians and bureaucrats have a natural tendency to give more weight to the
problems of large existing firms than to the diffículties facíng new and
unknown enterprises. But, the design of institutions and polícies should
counter this bias as much as possible. Within this context, an immediate move
to convertibility of the currency makes much more sense than continued
bureaucratic allocation of foreign exchange to businesses and individuals.Table 1 FIXED RATES
1) "automatic Central Bank" (Hong Kong)
2) Currency union (Belgium - Luxemburg)
3) fixed by multinational (E.M.S.)
agreement
4) fixed unilaterally (Austria, Norway)
Table 2 FLEXIBLE RATES
1) almost no interventions
2) "leaning against the wind"
3) wide, secret target zones
4) crawling peg with very frequent adjustmentsForm of convertibílitv
First, a brief review of the different options that are open to a small
economy which makes íts currency convertible. Table 1 shows four dífferent
versíons of fixed exchange rates; table 2 four ways to implement flexible
exchange rates.
Many of the small tradíng nations of Western Europe have opted for some form
of fixed exchange rates. Obviously, these countries have concluded that their
national economy is not an optímum currency area and that they should provide
theír citizens and business firms with a system in which foreign transactions
with at least some major trading partners can be conducted with little or no
currency risk. Membershíp of the EMS ís increasing, because German dominance
has delivered low and stable inflation for many years. If a new member country
ties its currency to the DMark in a manner that is viewed as credíble by the
fínancial markets, the country "buys" reputation from the Bundesbank. As long
as Germany continues to dominate the system, the reputatíon of its Central
Bank is a public good that can be provided to new members without diminishing
its supply to the old members of the EMS.
For new members, the "quality" of the national money may improve through a
tie-ín with thís German dominated system, and credibílity may be purchased
more cheaply than if the Central Bank had to obtain a strong reputation for
anti-ínflationary policies on its own.
On the other síde of the ledger there are obvious transitional costs as the
new EMS-member must adjust to lower inflation. Also, domestic politicians give
up the possibility to use the Central Bank for stimulating the economy in an
election year. Such misuse of the Central Bank in order to generate a
"political business cycle" ís a temptation in all countries that set their own
monetary policíes. One of the important advantages of a system such as the EMS
for the cítizens of the particípating countries ís that the common monetary
policy will not be under as much of a threat to play its part ín promoting re-
election of sitting governments as ín the case in which each country
implements íts own monetary policy.
Given al these advantages of a common monetary policy and a common
ínflationary path for participating member countríes, should one advocata somea
form of cooperation between the monetary authorities in the small economíes
of Eastern Europe and the Bundesbank? Note first that countries may
unilaterally decide to couple their monetary policies to those of the
Bundesbank or the provider of any other major currency. Austria is a good
example. The Austrian money market has been integrated for many years wíth the
German money market and the Austrian monetary authoritles can conduct open-
market operations in DMark. This system does not require any form of approval
by the German authorities and has resulted in an exchange race between the
Austrian Schilling and the DMark that is as stable as the exchange rate
between the DMark and any of the EMS-partners. Hence, we can discuss whether
the economíes of Eastern Europe should try to emulate the Austrian example
without having to wait for consent by the current membership of the EMS.
Some influential experts have advocated an even stronger form of fixed
exchange rates. Prof. Allan H. Meltzer Z has advocated a monetary authority
for the Sovíet Union along the lines of the Hong Kong Example. He writes:
"credibility for the new monetary policy can be achieved most effectively if
the new system is seen to be a major departure from the old, and the
opportunities for discretion are severely restricted. The public mus[ be
convinced that the central bank and government will honor their commitment to
avoid inflation. I suggest that this is done most effectively if you restríct
the government's monetary role by establishing a monetary authority like the
Hong Kong or Singapore Monetary Authority. In such systems the exchange rate
is fixed. The authorities are empowered to issue money only if they receive
conver[ible currency, and they must withdraw money when they lose convertible
currency. They collect seigniorage, but they have no discretionary authoríty
to change the quantity of money and no legal means of doing so. Money can only
be issued to the extent that the country earns convertible currency.
This system has several advantages. Most important is the durability of the
commitment. Like Ulysses, ín the ancient Greek legend, you will have bound
yourself tíghtly. There are other advantages. Let me spell out a few. First,
the system focusses attention on the need to compete in world markets.
Efficiency in international markets begets domestic efficiency, and increased
domestic effíciency encourages exporting. Second, domestíc prices wouíd adjust
toward world levels. If the exchange rate ís fixed to the dollar or the mark,
domestic commodity prices will move toward U.S. or German prices for goods of
2 Monetary Reform ín the U.S.S.R, Moscow Address, September 17, 19909
the same quality. Third, interest rates will fall toward the world level. At
first there would be a risk premium but the premíum would decline as
confidence grows that the system will be maintained. Fourth, budget deficits
would be limited. All borrowing, whether denominated in domestic or foreign
currency, would have to be financed from domestic or foreign saving... This
would be a strong commitment. The closer you come to it, the more it will be
believed. A mixed system in which the exchange rate is fixed but adjustable
will be less credibie. If people doubt your commitment to monetary stability
they will charge rísk premíums in ínterest rates and wages r.o pay for possible
inflation."
In this strong form of fixed exchange rates, credibility and stability are
purchased abroad and achieved more quickly than under any alternative scheme.
However, the fixed exchange rate implies that domestic inflation is given by
world inflation so that not only domestic relative prices are imported from
abroad - a very desirable matter - but also domestic absolute prices are gíven
and no longer under much control by the domestic authorities. For a developed
economy with a stable or at most slowly changíng economic system this may not
be a disadvantage. For instance, if there is macroeconomic pressure on average
wage costs in industry in the Netherlands to decline relative to production
costs in Germany, the magnitude of such a decline wi11 be at most a few
percentage poinr.s. Given that German wagc rates increase at, say, 3-5 percent
per year there ís sufficient room to obtain a somewhat lower rate of increase
in Dutch wage costs for one or two years and the desired adJustment in
relative cost levels may be obtained.
In Eastern Europe, the economies are currently engaging in an almost
unprecedented economic transformation and it is impossible to predíct where
cost levels will turn out to be next year, in five years and in ten years
tíme. This uncertainty is starkly reflected by considering current black
market exchange rates and relative wages in Eastern Europe, neighbouríng
countries such as Turkey and Greece and the higher developed economies of
Western Europe. At current black market exchange rates ít would appear wage
costs in Eastern Europe are a small fraction of those ín, for instance, Turkey
with the differential increasing even further at this time. From a longer turn
perspectíve, which would base relative cost levels on fundamental factors such
as educational levels of the work force, institutional stability,
infrastructure and natural resources, it might be extreme to expect a
continuation of the situation in which wage costs in, for instance, Bulgaria10
are five times lower than in the industrial sector ín Turkey. Hence, there
cannot but be extreme unceztainty about the proper wage cost levels in the
economies of Eastern Europe over the next several years.
Under such circumstances fixing the nominal exchange rate ímposes all
necessary macroeconomic adjustments on nominal wages. It might be necessary
to alter nominal wage levels by very substantial amounts over several
consecutive years. This, in my view, will impose great hardships on wage
earners and will also make it impossible in the meantime to ask wage earners
to engage in longer-term nominal contracts such as home mortgages.3
What about fíxing the exchange rate for a briefer period and wíthout going to
the extreme of the Hong Kong model? Early evaluations of the Polish experiment
strongly suggests that fixing the exchange rate for a longish period on the
basis of the most recent black market exchange rate results in an initial
undervaluation. For, the black market exchange rate was formed in a period of
great uncertainty about the future exchange rate regime and possibly during
conditions of incipient hyperinflatíon. Currency substitution will be
extremely important under such circumstances and the demand for domestic money
very low. In fact, estimates suggested that two thirds of the currency
circulating in Poland was foreign currency rather than domestic currency.
Additionally, fixing the exchange rate will not reduce domestic ínflation as
measured in domestic currency to world levels overnight. Probably domestic
inflation will continue to be substantially above world inflation and this
again will ínfluence the initial setting of the fixed exchange rate. Combiníng
these two factors may well zesult in a severe undervaluation which is costly
because it leads to wrong decisions by producers and consumers and is in
itself a source of ínflationary pressure. This would suggest great caution in
fixing the exchange rate for a longer períod of time and not necessarily
following the most recent black market rate.
3 Some form of indexation of savings and mortgages contracts would help:
under índexation the real rate of interest is fixed when the claim is bought
or sold in the primary market, and additionally inflation is compensated for
once or twice a year. It must be possible to combine indexed long-term savings
with indexed home mortgages, but it will be diffícult for the banks to assume
any mismatch of maturitíes in such an indexed market under a fixed exchange
rate with great uncertainty about future rates of inflation. For under a Hong
Kong type system the banks will have nominal (non-indexed) reserved
instruments domínate. It is hard to see how banks could then offer indexed
mortgages to new home owners, without some governmental institution providíng
insurance of all default risk on such assets as well as providíng help with
any mismatch between indexed savíngs and indexed mortgages.11
There is an obvious trade-off between attempting to achieve immediate
credibility for the monetary authoritíes through fixing the exchange rate but
imposing great costs on the labour market, or optíng for a less fixed exchange
rate regime which will be easíer on wage formatíon in the labour market but
impiies that credibility for monetary and exchange rate policy will take
longer to achieve.
At the other extreme end of Chis spectrum would be a purely floating exchange
rate. This has not been the institution of choice for the trading nations of
Western Europe, the sole exception being Switzerland. In north America,
however, Canada has maintained a floating exchange rate with respect to the
U.S., even though the United States is a more dominating trading and
investment partner for Canada than any natíon in Western Europe with respect
to Germany. Hence, a floating exchange rate is a feasible option, but most
smaller nations prefer a fixed exchange rate with a major partner or
participation in a fixed exchange rate system such as the EMS. For Eastern
Europe a pure float would appear to have an overriding disadvantage, namely
that it would be viewed as indicating a lack of disciplíne in the area of
fiscal policy. Currently, statistics on budget deficits and the way in which
they are financed are scarce and of poor quality so that internatíonal
financial markets are very uncertain about the fiscal policíes being followed.
The transition to a market economy generates continuing uncertainty about
budgetary policies for many more years: how quickly will subsidies be
abolished, how easy will it be for displaced workers to find new employment,
how much infrastructure is required to attract foreign direct investment and
to make a more attractive home for domestic savíngs, and finally, how much of
the government's expenditures can be covered with domestíc taxation? None of
these questions will have predictable answers for several years to come.
If the authorities choose a floating exchange rate it will be regarded as a
sign that they do not wish to gíve up the option of coveríng part of future
deficits through money creation with its consequences for the value of the
currency. Because the monetary base as a stock is small in respect to the
annual uncertainty regarding the government budget deficit, any news about
future budget deficits and the extent to which they may be financed through
Central Bank creation of new money will have a major impact on the market's
expectation of the future monetary base. Hence, great uncertainty regarding
the exchange rate will result and the foreign value of the currency will
fluctuate with each píece of news regarding future budgetary policy. Such1`L
uncertainty about exchange rate movements even in the very short run wíll be
costly for businesses and individuals.
Real rates of interest
A common policy mistake in many developing countries has been for the
authorities to intervene in the credit market and to depress real rates of
interest. On the surface, such actions províde borrowers with a reduced cost
of capital, but the policy makes no sense because it reduces the amount of
savings. Hence, the supply of credit through the official sector of the
economy falls so much short of the demand at the government influenced
interest rate, that credit rationing becomes a necessíty, with all its
dísadvantages of political bías in favour of large established enterprises and
risk of curruption. At the same time, an informal "curb" market for credit
will develop in which borrowers who can not be satísfíed on the official
market will try to attract funds at higher-possily even illegal - rates of
interest. Such a two-tier credit market is hugely ineffícient.
Government should not be afraid of a high real rate of interest, because wíth
stable political and legal conditions, the current scarcity of capital should
imply a very high marginal real return on new capital and hence, a real rate
of interest that is high by the s[andards of the capi[al-rich índustrial
countríes. Experience in several developing countries has shown that
deregulation of the credit market and a move towards higher returns for
domestic savers coincided with a take-off of economic growth.
During the transition to a market economy the authoríties may wísh to either
establish a national savings bank or to issue guarantees for the return on
savings attracted by private sector or foreign-owned banks. If there is a
natíonal savings bank, the authorities therefore have to set a rate of
interest for domestíc savings. If the rate of inflatíon over the relevant
horízon Is uncertaín lt may be sensíble [o offor a guarant,oed real rnto of
return and to compensaCe the domestic savers afterwards for the actual rate
of inflation, using a scheme simular to that of the indexed national savings
ín the United Kingdom ". With a rate of exchange that is fixed for long
` The real rate of return on indexed retail savings in the U.K. is very
slightly possitive; símultaneously the U.K. su[horities have issued indexed
government debt since 1981 on which real rates of return have varied from 2
percent to slightly above 4 percent per annwn.13
periods, domestic short-term interest rates no longer are free polícy
variables, because the authoríties will have to follow a target for the stock
of international reserves. To the extent to which the domestic banking system
needs to be provided with net foreign assets, solvabílity of the domestic
banks will also constrain the freedom to alter domestíc rates of return on
savings. With short-term rates needed as instruments to maintain the fíxed
exchange rate, the authoritíes will have less chance to follow policíes at the
long-term end of the yield curve that provide high and stable rates of return
to domestic long-term savers.
By contrast, a more flexible rate of exchange allow for far greater freedom
in followíng an interest rate policy that is targeted towards encouraging
domestic savíngs and discouraging currency substitution ínto foreígn
currencies or capital flíght.5
With the resource cost of the Hong Kong type system so much larger, because
the country has to borrow to set up its central bank and commercial banking
system rather than a[tractíng capítal for investment in fiscal infra-
structure, and given the tremendous uncertainty regarding the medium-term
evolvement of real wage costs, a rather more flexible system seems
advisable.fi However, a more flexible exchange rate does not mean that físcal
defícits can conveniently contínue to be fínanced through money creation or
that the need to move to a domestic structure of relative prices that conforms
better to world market conditions is less urgent.
In my víew, the best transitiona.l regime for the countries ín Eastern Europe
may be a rather flexible fixed rate or a rather fixed flexible rate: either
a unílateral fix for a relatively brief period or a crawling peg system with
quite frequent adjustments. Under either system the domestic banks can operate
with reserves denominated primarily ín domestic currency and there is no need
5 Obvíously a devalueíng exchange rate leads to higher domestic interest
rates, but the "spikes" in interest rates, partícularly at the short end, that
are so typícal for the final stages of a fixed exchange rate that becomes
harder and harder to defend can be avoíded.
6 Walters and Hamke have also argued ín favour of a Currency Board rather
than an independent Central Bank for the ex-socialist countries. Prof. Tew
pointed out the two problems with such a proposal - how does the Currency
Board acquíre its foreign assets?; do Commercial Banks also have to own large
stocks of foreign assets7 - in an intervention in the London "Financial Times"
(FEB 23, 1990).14
for the nation as a whole to allocate foreign reserves to serve as reserves
to the banking system. In a Hong Kong type system or in any other version of
long-term fixation of the exchange rate and full convertibilíty on current
account, the domestic banks will only be able to grow if a substantial part
of theír capital and reserves either consists of foreign currency or can be
converted into such at little notice and with little cost.
Currencv reform - a historical case studv
After World War II the Netherlands regained its freedom in May 1945. A new
civilian government came into office at the end of June. Between July and late
September a thorough currency reform was unacted. It goes without saying that
post-war conditions were ín many ways different, both politically and
economically, from the situation in which the ex-socialist countries of
Eastern Europe find themselves today. But, the currency reform coped with a
very substantial "monetary overhang" and was supported democratically. Also,
Holland had to rebuild its economy with very little foreign fínancial
assistance while simultaneously facing a drain on resources because of its
costly initial resistance to the independence movement in Indonesia, a former
Dutch colony.
An authorítar.ive analysis of the 1945 currency reform was published in 1973
by the responsible ex-Minister of Finance, Pieter Lieftinck who after leaving
the Netherlands had a distinguíshed career at the IMF and the World Bank. ~
When Líeftinck became Minister of Finance shortly after the War, national
income was estimated by the Dutch authorities to be 5 billion guilders, but
private sector estímates at that time were seven or eight billion, evidencing
a substantial uncertainty about the transactions demand for money B. The
money supply at war-end amounted to 11 billíon guilders, over four tímes as
much as at the start of the war in 1940. Wíth national income in current
guilders slightly below the 1938 level obviously the income velocity of money
~"The Post-War Financial Rehabílitatíon of the Netherlands", The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
8 In 1938 national income at market príces equaled 5.4 billion guílders;
the War had reduced national income to approximately 3 bíllion guilders in
early 1945 (annual rate).ls
was unsustaínably low. At the same tíma, it was widely felt that much of the
increase in the money stock had come ínto the hands of black market opperators
or war profíteers, so that a proportional shrinkage of money balances would
not be a "just" solution.
Lieftinck wrítes: "On July 9th, 1945, as a first measure against hoarding of
money made ín the black market, all 100 guilder notes were withdrawn from
circulatíon. Subject to a brief time limit, the facility was opened for
holders of such notes, to be credíted for the amount on a blocked bank
account" (the 100 guílder note was the largest denomination in circulation at
the time). On September 26, 1945 the government withdrew all bank notes in
circulation and blocked all bank deposits. At the same time the existing bank
secrecy law was suspended. "This measure was íntended to serve three
objectives. The first was to bríng into the open all money holdings, in
particular those ímproperly acquired during the years of foreign occupation...
The second was to register all liquid assets for the purpose of tax assessment
under the existing tax legislation and the special reconstruction taxes that
were goíng to be imposed. The third and most important objective was to re-
establish an appropriate relatíonship between the quantity of goods available
and the supply of money ín circulation".
During the week following the currency withdrawal and blockíng of bank
deposits, each citizen received an identical small nominal amount of money and
later that same week additional money was released to finance wages earned
over the week. In subsequent weeks the government contínued to release money
for wage payments as well as special releases to meet firms' requirements for
working capital. Bank credit remain subject to licensing and often requíred
investigation of all blocked accounts owned by the firm. In Lieftincks words:
"By the end of 1945 the ratio between national income and the amount of money
in circulation had almost returned to its pre-war level".
" The government opened different options for the remaining blocked money:
(1) continuatíon of these holdíngs on blocked account in the hope and
expectation of future releases;
(2) transfer of limited amounts to a medium-term saving account;
(3) use of these holdings for payment of tax arrears incurred during the16
occupation;
(4) use of these holdings to fulfill obligations in respect to the new
special reconstruction taxes to be imposed;
(5) subscription to long-term, low-interest bearing Goverrunent loans".
Because the last three options were most popular, the blocked money became
available to the Treasury, "weze it was held and only gradually released for
public spending according to the growing needs connected with the
rehabilitation of the economy".
As a result of these measures, the income velocity of money which had fallen
to approximately 0.3 at war end and 0.45 in the summer of 1945, rose to almost
2(very similar to the 1938 level) in December of 1945 and remained very
stable around that level for the next four years. The nomínal money supply had
been reduced from 11 billion guilders in May 1945 to 4.1 billion guílders at
the year-end. "Thereafter it rose steadily and it was practically stabilized
at the level of around 7,2 bíllion guilders ín 1948". Wholesale prices
increased by 25-30 percent between 1945 and 1948 whereas the cost of living
went up by 16 percenc. Real wages were virtually stable.
I quote from Lieftínck's description of the accompanying tax reform:
"Since during the war years tax evasion had been practiced on a large scale
and tax assessment had run into a backlog, supplementary tax declarations were
ímposed with respect to all existing direct taxes, and provisíonal tax
assessments were made covering the year 1944 and the first eight months of
1945. In order to speed up the collection of tax arrears and in anticipatíon
of the announced reconstructíon taxes, a system of voluntary and obligatory
tax deposits (advance payments to the Treasury) was introduced which by the
end of 1946 amounted to over 1,800 million guilders. To supplement the revenue
from normal taxes, two special reconstruction taxes were imposed:
(1) a so-called capital increase levy on the accrual during the war years
of all personal wealth (money holdings and all other assets taxable
under the existing wealth tax), at a rate of 50 to 90 per cent
differentiated on the basis of a propriety test of the nature of the
acquisítion and the amount of the increase;17
(2) a so-called once-for-all capital levy on all personal wealth at the end
of the war, at a rate of 4 to 20 per cent by application of a
progression scale.
The collectíon of these special taxes, the total yield of which amounted to
over 3,000 míllion guilders, was spread over a number of years, and io the
extent that they were not paid out of blocked accounts these levies
contributed considerably to counteracting otherwise generated new inflationary
pressures. With a view to making the Government budget a better policy
instrument adjusted to the circumstances, its structure was for the time being
modified. Instead of the traditional division ín two parts, a current account
and a capital account, the current budget was divided in an ordinary account,
an extra-ordinary account and a separate budget chapter for the newly
established Agrícultural Equalization Fund. T'he ordinary account covered
normal recurrent expenditures. The extra-ordinary account covered all
expenditures that were directly connected with those functions of the
Government Chat were undertaken to cope with the dislocation of the economy,
including war damages, and, therefore, were considered to be of a temporary
character (the administration and liquidation of the war heritage). The budget
of the Agricultural Equalization Fund served to give an estimate of the
balance of the cost of farm and consumer subsidíes and the yield of
agricultural export levies, the former being required to ensure a reasonable
remuneration to the farmers while at the same time keeping the food bi11 of
the consumers down. Its actual outcome was highly dependent on changes in
world market prices; and given the objectives just mentioned, the balance of
[his account could not be predicted reliably. The capital budget maintained
its tradítional character of covering expenditures that increased the durable
assets of the public domain and the revenues derived from those assets.
Particularly the introduction of the extra-ordinary account in the current
budget proved to serve an extremely useful purpose because it avoided the
mixing up of recurrent and non-recurrent expendítures, facilitated a special
surveillance and an appropriate phasing of the latter, and embodied a constant
reminder that those expenditures were temporary and should be abolíshed as
soon as possible".
The Dutch government was not faced ín 1945 with widespread use of foreign
currency. Also, convertibility of the guilder was postpcned until the next
decade. In the 1950's the European Payments Union (EPU) remained the
institutíonal mechanism for international payments until late 1958. The return18
to convertibillty was postponed for so many years ín Western Europe because
of a perceíved "dollar shortage". This term only makes sense if one assumes
as general dollar overvaluatíon of the West-European currencíes during the
immediate post-war years. 9 Because in Eastern Europe unofficial markets
provide information about the exchange rate between local money and the DMark
or US dollar, there should be no excuse for establishing an exchange rate that
would undervalue the DMark or pollar to such an extent that it would make
sense to speak of a DMark or pollar shortage. Hence, the historical experience
in Western Europe with the EPU in the post-war period does not offer many
direct lessions for Eastern Europe today, apart from the obvious one that it
is hazardous to fix exchange rates in periods of great economic transitlon.
However, the Dutch experience with a currency reform immediately after the War
is of interest as a historical case-study of the removal of a monetary
overhang larger than a full year's national income in a way that was
democra[ically acceptable.
9 See: Peter Bofinger: "A Multilateral Payments Union for Eastern
Europe7", Discussion Paper nr. 458, Centre for Economic Policy Research,
Londen 1990.19
Need for a nominal anchor
During the transition to a market economy forecasts of nominal national income
at market prices wíll be subject to large forecast errors. At the same time,
the íncome velocity of money will depend on trends in economic growth and
inflation, as well as on the availability of money substitutes, both in form
of domestic savíngs accounts and in the form of foreign currency. The Polish
example has shown already how quickly the importance of foreign currency for
domestic transactions can change over time, and this will make estima[es of
the velocity of money even more hazardous. With both national income and
velocity being so hard to forecast, how can the Central Bank provide a nominal
anchor for the economy íf one rej.ects the option of fíxing the exchange zate
for a long period as I have done in this paper?
Perhaps the Dutch example may offer a useful suggestion. Lieftinck suggests
in his book that the authorities were able to make continuous estimates of at
least a very large proportion of national íncome by monitoring trends in
wages. Duríng the first few months after the currency reform the Central Bank
apparently set a path for the money stock on the basis of its estímates of
wages paid to workers 1~. If indeed the quality of up-to-date statistics on
wages is clearly superior to the statistics on output or domestic sales, than
it may make sense for a brief period to use estimates on the incomes side for
setting monetary policy. Assuming the authorities will continue to determine
wages ín the socialized sector, it should be possible to allow for free wage
formation ín the privatized sector of the economy and to free almost all
domestic prices whilst maintaining a perspective on nominal developments in
the economy by monitoríng very closely trends in wages. During this first
stage, an anti-inflationary polícy would effectively mean a consistent polícy
on wages in the nationalízed sector. In the Dutch case, the íncome velocity
of money became remarkably stable from year-end 1945 onwards, i.e. no more
than 8 months after the war. Once velocity has stabilized, the Central Bank
could try to target the rate of growth of an appropríate monetary aggregate,
la In addition, as shown in the quotation above, the Centzal Bank helped
to provided credit to enterprises.2n
uaing the type of feed-back rule advocated by many monetary economísts 11
Env
The East European nations are discussing convertibility of their currencies
under exciting but very difficult political conditions. The movement towards
political and economic freedom should in my view include the transition to a
fully convertible currency, and I have tried to provide some arguments in
favour of making the currency convertible as soon as it is political feasible
to conduct a fiscal policy that does not require inflationary finance of the
budget deficit. Many of the points in this paper were well expressed in a
recent conference contribution by Hahn-Been Lee, a former deputy Príme
Minister of South Korea who spoke on "The change ín the East Bloc" 12
"Once the Euzopeans achieve equalization of domestic prices with external
prices, they will gain the confidence of their people, who will then be able
to trust theír own currency...Once people begin to have that valuable trust
in their own currency, they begin to adopt the habit of saving, making
investment possible. Saving is a prerequisite for the privatization of state-
owned industries. Only after such successful economic management does popular
democracy have a fair chance at stability...
11 See for example, B. McCallum, Monetary Theory, MacMillan,1989
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